High on the party, low on the state. A quantum leap in the process of China’s reconstruction. OSW Commentary NUMBER 265 | 18.04.2018 by Jakóbowski, Jakub & Bogusz, Michał
1OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 265
www.osw.waw.plCentre for Eastern Studies NUMBER 265 | 18.04.2018
Jakub Jakóbowski, Michał Bogusz
At its annual session in March 2018, the National People’s Congress (NPC) approved a series 
of changes to the structure and organisation of the Central People’s Government (also known 
as the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, further in the text referred to as the 
central government) and an amendment to China’s constitution. It also announced nomina-
tions to several important state offices. This represents a crowning achievement and formal 
confirmation of the process of changes to the Chinese system of power that has been ongoing 
since 2012. The purpose of these changes is to secure continued governance by the Commu-
nist Party of China (CPC), to maintain domestic stability and to break the impasse in economic 
and social reforms. The general thrust of these changes involves a shift in decision-making 
power and a transfer of control in terms of how the state apparatus works to organs of the 
CPC, at the cost of central government institutions and local governments. This is being done 
by concentrating power in the hands of the party’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping, who in 
recent years has used the CPC structures to boost discipline within the party and state insti-
tutions, to increase coordination in domestic and foreign policy and to revive the process of 
economic and social reforms. The changes to the structure of the administrative apparatus 
follow the centralist ambitions of Xi Jinping. This refers both to how the central government 
operates and to Beijing’s influence on local governments. These changes will considerably 
impact the functioning of the state and China’s international relations.
In the Chinese system of governance, the NPC is 
the sole source of law and power in the state. 
However, in practice its acts reflect the decisions 
already taken by the main bodies of the CPC. 
The recent session of the NPC served to imple-
ment the changes Xi Jinping has been introduc-
ing in the Chinese system of power in terms of 
the new structure and personnel composition 
of the bureaucratic apparatus. The recent abo-
lition of the two term limit, which until recent-
ly was stipulated in the constitution, has ena-
bled Xi Jinping to continue to hold the office of 
President of People’s Republic of China (a state 
function) post-2023. Regardless of the fact that 
the source of his power is the function he is hold-
ing within the party (General Secretary of the 
CPC), enabling him to de facto hold the office of 
President of China for life is a symbolic gesture 
that seals the process of structural changes as 
a whole. Official nominations to key civil ser-
vice posts have also been announced, includ-
ing vice-president of China, the prime minister 
and his deputies, and ministers in the central 
government. The nominations reflect person-
nel decisions taken at the 19th CPC convention 
in October 2017, during which Xi Jinping’s 
closest collaborators were promoted within 
the CPC hierarchy.
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Challenges to the central government
In spite of the need to carry out wide-rang-
ing economic and social reforms, the CPC has 
limited tools at its disposal to actually do so. 
Until recently, the central government’s exten-
sive bureaucratic apparatus included 32 minis-
tries and around fifteen ministry-level institu-
tions. The absence of a clear division of tasks 
and the drawn-out decision-making chain are 
causing problems with coordination, mutual-
ly exclusive regulations, and difficulties with 
maintaining the proper sequence of reforms. 
The bureaucratic apparatus is also a setting 
in which the conflict between competing fac-
tions within the CPC is being conducted, which 
makes the change implementation process con-
ditional upon personnel issues and opens the 
doors to internal obstruction. The basic chal-
lenge the CPC leadership is facing is to regain 
control of the central state apparatus. 
From the point of view of the CPC leadership, 
the sine qua non condition for the reforms to 
be implemented is to gain control of their im-
plementation at the local level (provinces, coun-
ties, cities). Back in the 1980s, China adopted 
a model in which Beijing set a general direction 
for the initiatives to be implemented and local 
authorities were free to carry out these initia-
tives according to local needs. Until recently, 
when changes were implemented which were 
against the interest of local CPC members and 
interest groups, in particular in such areas as 
economic development, environmental protec-
tion and the urbanisation process, the central 
government had limited means of putting pres-
sure on the local level structures. The central 
government’s weakness also results from the 
fact that the state hierarchy is secondary to 
the party hierarchy. In a situation where many 
ministers and agency heads are less rooted in 
the party apparatus than local party officials 
are, their ability to successfully implement the 
central government’s decisions is often merely 
illusory. 
The nature of the changes
The purpose of the recent institutional changes 
is to resolve the problems discussed above by 
concentrating power in the hands of the CPC 
leadership.
Elimination of a portion of ‘sovereign principal-
ities’ in central administration and a clear sepa-
ration of the competences of specific ministries 
and agencies is intended to reduce the poten-
tial for rivalry and thereby slow down the natu-
ral process of internal tension arising within the 
ruling camp.
Stepping up direct control by the CPC’s Central 
Committee of the ongoing functioning of the 
state apparatus, by reflecting the Central Com-
mittee’s structures in the organisation of the cen-
tral government, is intended to enable specific 
bodies and other more informal groups within 
the Central Committee to directly impact the cen-
tral government components ‘ascribed’ to them.
Personnel changes in the executive bodies of 
key ministries and central institutions are de-
signed to allow Xi Jinping to remove his politi-
cal opponents from the government structures 
and install in their place trusted collaborators 
able to carry out his agenda.
Subordinating the provincial structures to 
central-level institutions, in areas such as the 
budget and the chain of command, is done to 
facilitate the decision-making centre within the 
Central Committee of the CPC, so as to devise 
effective methods for exerting pressure on lo-
cal party members. 
The absence of a clear division of tasks and 
the drawn-out decision-making chain are 
causing problems with continuation of the 
reforms.
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The structural and personnel changes intro-
duced at the NPC’s session focus on those areas 
of state governance the CPC considers of prior-
ity importance.
Combating corruption. The anti-corruption 
campaign that has been in place since 2013 is 
the main tool for disciplining CPC members at 
central and local levels. Until recently, these ac-
tivities were carried out by a party body, the 
Central Disciplinary Committee of the CPC, 
which in recent years has expanded its scope 
of action and managed to take control of lo-
cal committees operating at the provincial lev-
el. At the NPC’s session a new institution was 
established, the National Supervision Commit-
tee, with a legal status equal to that of courts 
and the public prosecutor’s office. It echoes 
the structure and the personnel composition 
of the Central Disciplinary Committee of the 
CPC, which is intended to institutionalise the 
anti-corruption initiatives implemented so far. 
The head of the new institution is Yang Xiaodu 
(see Appendix 1).
The economic policy. Since March 2018, Chi-
na’s economic policy has been managed by the 
newly appointed deputy prime minister Liu He 
(see Appendix 1), the closest economic advisor to 
Xi Jinping and member of the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee of the CPC. He is dep-
uty head of the National Committee for Devel-
opment and Reforms (the main planning body) 
and head of the Central Committee’s Finance 
and Economy Leading Small Group – China’s 
actual centre of economic power. The changes 
implemented signal the continued marginalisa-
tion of the prime minister, Li Keqiang (tradition-
ally responsible for economic matters), and the 
concentration of economic control in the hands 
of Xi Jinping’s most trusted advisor.
The fiscal system. Tax offices collecting local 
and central taxes will be merged at the level of 
provinces and lower local government levels. The 
purpose of this move is for the central govern-
ment to take control of the collection of local 
taxes. This will enable Beijing to not only gain full 
control of the fiscal system but also to limit the 
scale of abuse and the practice of local structures 
at various levels imposing illegal taxes, which is 
one of the main sources of social discontent.
Environmental protection. The newly created 
Ministry of the Environment has been grant-
ed powers to enforce laws on environmental 
protection and prevent the adverse effects 
of climate change (see Appendix 2). Li Ganjie, 
one of the youngest party activists and Xi Jin-
ping’s trusted collaborator, has been appointed 
minister (see Appendix 1). This is intended to 
enable Beijing to break the resistance of local 
structures that view the more stringent envi-
ronmental restrictions as a barrier to achieving 
macro-economic goals.
Urbanisation and agrarian policy. Beijing 
would like the new central-level bodies: the Min-
istry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and Rural Affairs and the Forests and 
Pastures Administration (see Appendix 2) to take 
over full control of the process of urbanisation 
and spatial planning as well as of the issue of land 
management in rural areas. It is unclear whether 
Beijing intends to strip local authorities of these 
powers or whether this is merely an attempt to 
unify the rules and eliminate abuse. The sale of 
the right to use land for up to 50 years is one 
of the main sources of income for local govern-
ments and a tool in achieving macro-economic 
goals. However, it involves displacing local rural 
communities, which is connected with abuse 
and embezzlement of compensation funds.
The long-term effect of restructuring will 
be a major change in the relations between 
the central government and the local gov-
ernments.
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Foreign policy. Promotions of key diplomats in 
the party hierarchy during the 19th convention 
of the CPC and the new nominations announced 
at the recent NPC session are intended to more 
closely align the party’s main decision-making 
body in foreign policy (the CPC’s Political Bu-
reau) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
is responsible for the implementation of this 
policy. They are also intended to shorten the 
decision-making process and entrust Xi Jin-
ping’s trusted collaborators with managing in-
ternational relations. The promotion of Wang 
Qishan (see Appendix 1) to the office of Vice 
President of China is interpreted as entrusting 
Xi Jinping’s most trustworthy collaborator with 
supervising China’s relations with the USA. 
Another key figure in foreign relations is Yang 
Jiechi, a diplomat promoted to the Political 
Bureau, head of the Central Committee’s For-
eign Policy Leading Small Group operating 
within the party structure. Deputy prime min-
ister Liu He is to be partly responsible for for-
eign economic policy. Wang Yi, a member of 
the Central Committee of the CPC, remains the 
person responsible for supervising the imple-
mentation of this policy.
The consequences for bilateral relations
The centralisation of and the institutional sup-
port for the role of the CPC translate into an 
ongoing diminishment of state bodies and their 
reduction to auxiliary and symbolic institutions, 
including in international relations. Increasingly 
frequently, the intergovernmental contacts will 
be managed by individuals holding important 
positions in the CPC hierarchy, and representa-
tives of the state bodies will only serve as liai-
son officers connecting their institutions with 
the actual decision-making centre. On the one 
hand, this will increase the decision-making po-
tential of the apparatus, but on the other hand 
it may prolong the time taken to reach deci-
sions. The long-term effect of restructuring will 
be a major change in the relations between cen-
tral government and local governments, which 
will also impact the level of independence of 
local authorities in their contacts with foreign 
partners, particularly in economic cooperation. 
So far, this level of cooperation has been high. 
The government’s restructuring also involves 
updating the list of counterparties and contact 
points for ministries and institutions operating 
in specific sectors (see Appendix 2).
APPENDIX 1
Major nominations
Wang Qishan (b. 1948), Vice President of China. Considered Xi Jinping’s most trusted collaborator. 
In 2012–2017, head of the Central Disciplinary Committee of the CPC, responsible for carrying out 
a large-scale anti-corruption campaign. In 2012–2017, member of the CPC’s Political Bureau and of 
its Standing Committee (the core of the party’s leadership). Due to informal age limitations, he is 
no longer member of the Political Bureau. Information leaked to the press suggests that he will be 
responsible for China’s global policy and for its relations with the USA.
Liu He (b. 1952), Chinese economist, graduate of Harvard University (1990). Considered Xi Jinping’s 
principal economic advisor and co-author of the reform agenda announced in 2013. In 2017, he 
was promoted to the Political Bureau of the CPC and appointed head of the Central Committee’s 
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Finance and Economy Leading Small Group. In recent years, he has competed with prime minister 
Li Keqiang for control of economic affairs. During the NPC’s session he was promoted to the office 
of deputy prime minister. Deputy head of the main planning institution – the National Council for 
Development and Reforms.
Yang Xiaodu (b. 1953), director of the newly created National Supervision Committee. Member 
of the Political Bureau of the CPC, formerly a party activist in Shanghai (where he cooperated with 
Xi Jinping) and Tibet. Since 2014, deputy head of the Central Disciplinary Committee of the CPC 
(supervised by Wang Qishan).
Li Ganjie (b. 1967), minister of the environment, responsible for implementing environmental pro-
tection policy and for combating the effects of climate change. Since May 2017, head of the party 
committee at the Ministry of the Environment. Since October 2017 and the 19th party convention, 
member of the Central Committee of the CPC. Since March 2018, the youngest minister in China’s 
history. He started his career in the National Nuclear Safety Administration (1991–1998), ultimately 
holding an executive post. In 2016–2017, deputy head of the party committee of the Hebei province 
(which surrounds Beijing). 
APPENDIX 2
The restructuring of ministries and central government agencies
Dissolved ministries and ministry level agencies: 
Ministry of Agriculture: its tasks have been split between the Ministry of Natural Resources, 
the Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the Ministry of Transpor-
tation, the Ministry for Managing Extraordinary Affairs, and the Forests and Pastures Administration.
Ministry of Culture: its tasks have been fully taken over by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
Ministry of Environmental Protection: its tasks have been fully taken over by the Ministry of 
the Environment.
Ministry of Land and Resources: its tasks have been split into the Ministry of Natural Resources, the 
Ministry of the Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the Ministry for Managing 
Extraordinary Affairs, and the Forests and Pastures Administration.
Ministry of Supervision: its tasks have been fully taken over by the State Supervision Committee.
National Committee for Health and Family Planning: its tasks have been split into the National 
Health Committee and the State Medical Safety Administration.
Ministries and ministry level agencies which received new powers:
Ministry of Transportation: managing control and supervision of the fishing fleet.
National Audit Bureau: auditing major projects; supervising the central budget; controlling tax 
proceeds and expenditures; auditing the budgetary responsibility of executive staff of state-con-
trolled companies; assuming the role of the Council to Supervise Key Projects of State-Controlled 
Companies.
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People’s Bank of China: drafting bills and regulations; devising a prudential framework for 
the banking and insurance sectors
New ministries and ministry level agencies:
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs: most tasks of the Ministry of Agriculture; responsibility 
for rural investment projects; comprehensive agriculture development projects, arable land rehabil-
itation projects, arable land reclamation projects.
Ministry of Culture and Tourism: the tasks of the Ministry of Culture, the National Tourism Admin-
istration and the State Administration of the Press, Publications, Radio, Film and Television (selected 
tasks).
Ministry for Managing Extraordinary Affairs: work safety; coordination and provision of relief 
during natural disasters; prevention of forest and pasture fires; supervision of fire fighting services 
(only those at the disposal of the People’s Liberation Army), prevention of geological disasters. 
Ministry of Natural Resources: most of the tasks of the Ministry of Land and Resources and the 
State Ocean Administration; all tasks of the National Administration of Geodesy, Cartography and 
Geoinformation; managing spatial planning of rural and urban areas; managing the process of reg-
istering the rights to water resources, forests and pastures and exercising auditing powers in these 
fields.
Ministry for Veterans: providing help to veterans; helping the officers’ corps to transition to civilian 
jobs; taking over a portion of the tasks from: the Department of Political Work of the Central Military 
Commission and the Department of Logistics Support of the Central Military Commission.
Ministry of the Environment: a portion of the National Nuclear Safety Administration tasks; all 
tasks of the Ministry of Environmental Protection; responsibility for combating the effects of climate 
change and for the reduction of greenhouse gas emission; supervision of the prevention of water 
and groundwater contamination; creation of water protection zones; managing pollution limits; 
protection of the shoreline and the maritime environment; environmental protection under the 
South-North Water Transfer project; supervision and management of control of pollution generated 
by agriculture.
National Health Committee: a portion of the tasks of the National Committee for Health and Fam-
ily Planning; logistics support for the National Old Age Committee and the State Council’s Leading 
Small Group for Medicine and Healthcare System Reform; implementation of the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control; supervision and management of health and safety at work and 
work-related risk.
